Introduction
Few would have been less surprised than the British Admiralty on the eve of the Falklands War to find the Royal Navy facing off against warships it had itself provided. For example, the doomed Type 42 destroyers HMS Coventry and HMS Sheffield had their counterparts in the Armada de la Republica (ARA); ARA Hercules and ARA Santisima Trinidad. The former had been completed by Vickers in 1977, while the latter had as recently as November 1981 been undergoing sea trials and missile training in British waters. For information on the Argentine flagship, Veinticinco de Mayo, naval strategists could refer to records on the World War II era Colossus Class aircraft carriers; the Argentine carrier had been completed as HMS Venerable in 1944; or liaise with staff in the Dutch navy, in which she had served as the HNLMS Karel Doorman until her sale in 1969.[i]
Indeed, information was at hand from NATO allies about almost every ship of consequence in the ARA. The American navy had supplied most of its force of destroyers, plus designs for the amphibious landing ship that facilitated invasion, while the French had constructed their small flotilla of Drummond Class corvettes. What was to become the most ill-famed ship of the entire war, ARA General Belgrano, was perhaps the one unit of the ARA whose original provenance was widely publicised at the time; the former Brooklyn Class light cruiser having served as the USS Phoenix during World War II.[ii] In fact, South American navies had always relied heavily on the major powers for the construction and design of their warships.
In 1982, the Royal Navy was sent to neutralise a threat that had its origins in militaristic policies pursued by foreign businesses and diplomats more than a century earlier. Beginning in the 1870s, British shipbuilding companies, with the support or acquiescence of their governments, fuelled a slowly intensifying naval arms race in South America, which culminated in the purchase of dreadnought battleships prior to the outbreak of World War I, and whose ripples could still be felt in San Carlos Water 70 years later.
Origins
It is rather difficult to pinpoint a specific date or event that initiated the ABC naval arms race between Argentina, Brazil and Chile. However, there are clearly identifiable events that impelled it, slowed it and ultimately brought it to an end.
In the 1860s, Brazil had the most powerful navy on the continent. In the aftermath of the American Civil War, some observers even regarded it as the most powerful in the western hemisphere, inferior only in military terms to the imperial navies of Britain, France and Russia. On some levels, Brazil’s naval predominance could be justified; it was by far South America’s largest and most populated country; it possessed the longest coastline, and had one of the world’s largest river systems to patrol. Brazil’s naval supremacy endured into the 1880s, when it was challenged and overtaken, first by Chile and later by Argentina.
It can be argued that events in Chile were a primary catalyst for the resultant arms race. The most significant of these was the War of the Pacific between 1879 and 1883, in which British-built warships played a crucial role. The War of the Pacific or ‘The Saltpetre War’ was fought between Chile and a Peruvian-Bolivian alliance over control of guano and nitrate deposits in the Atacama region in the north of what is now Chile. Nitrate had already become a strategic commodity, much sought after by major powers for its indispensible utility in explosives, while guano, which refers primarily to the droppings of seabirds and some coastal mammals, was known to be an excellent fertilizer. In fact, Chile and Peru had already been involved in a war over guano, but as allies. In 1864-66, an attempt was made to capture the guano-rich Chincha Islands, which lie just off the coast of Peru, for the Spanish crown. Although unsuccessful, the conflict brought home to the Chilean government the need to form its own navy. Spanish naval forces had bombarded the port of Valparaiso unopposed, sinking more than thirty ships, while American and British squadrons stood by in passive neutrality.
In the early 1870s, the Chilean government ordered two powerful ironclad warships from Britain. In fact, the two countries already had a long history of naval relations; the British Pacific Station had been set up in Valparaiso in the 1830s and had only recently been moved to British Columbia. Large numbers of Britons had migrated and settled in the country, especially in the Valparaiso area, and business ties were extensive. The Blanco Encalada and Almirante Cochrane were to prove decisive units in the coming naval encounters with Peru, whose own warships, the monitor Huascar and the broadside ironclad Independencia had also been acquired from Britain, in the 1860s. Under the astute command of Almirante Grau, the Huascar was able to harry Chilean naval forces and delay their invasion plans. However, the ship was eventually seized and remains to this day a prize of war. Chilean land forces soon overwhelmed their poorly-equipped Peruvian and Bolivian opponents. The resulting loss of territory was devastating for both countries. Bolivia lost direct access to the sea, while Peru surrendered its dominance of the saltpetre industry, which fell largely under British control. Moreover, The War of the Pacific was a sizable economic victory for Chile, which formed the pecuniary basis for an expansion of its navy. One estimate is that Chile’s national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902, due to increased revenues from their expanded territory. On the other hand, Peru and Bolivia are arguably still living with the economic consequences of their defeat.
Escalation
Chile had a further reason for developing its navy. Several times in the 1870s, it had come to diplomatic blows with Argentina over sovereignty of the unexplored and sparsely populated region of Patagonia. This had resulted in several maritime disputes and the seizure and counter-seizure of merchant vessels, although a naval confrontation along the Santa Cruz River was averted by the signing of a boundary treaty in 1881. Until the 1880s, Argentina’s navy could almost be described as ‘brown water’, having few armed, ocean-going vessels. Two small coastal defence ships; El Plata and Los Andes had been added around the time of Chile’s ironclad acquisition, both from Liverpool shipbuilders Cammell Laird. The Argentine navy also acquired the Almirante Brown, a small battery ram of 4,200 tons, in 1882. This ship was built by Samuda Brothers, a shipyard based in London’s Isle of Dogs. However, the appearance of this ship alone is unlikely to have sparked the escalating naval arms race between Argentina and Chile in the 1890s. Of more consequence perhaps, was the economic prosperity both countries enjoyed prior to this period. Argentina was also a prime locus for British investment in the 1880s, and the country saw a massive expansion in British-backed railroad construction, which in turn spurred growth in agricultural industries and in particular that of refrigerated meat exports.
Meanwhile, Brazil was also beginning to enjoy export-oriented economic success in booming markets for its rubber and coffee. The Samuda Brothers shipyard was also responsible for the construction of two new ships for the Brazilian navy commencing in 1881. On completion, Riachuelo and Adiquabã were regarded as the two most powerful warships in the western hemisphere, and their appearance alarmed the United States government enough for them to commence their own battleship building programme, starting with the USS Texas and Maine.
Indeed, the Brazilian ships may well have been a response to events happening on the other side of the continent. The order date would suggest so. Presumably, the Brazilian government was anxious about the challenge to its regional hegemony presented by Chile’s startling victory and acquisition of territory in the War of the Pacific. However, these two ships were to be the last major units ordered for the Brazilian navy for more than a decade, during which time its hegemony would be eclipsed by its more bellicose southern neighbours. What effect the appearance of these two Brazilian battleships had on the governments of Argentina and Chile is unclear. What is certain is that about this time, the national treasuries of both found themselves in a strong financial position which could afford an expansion in their own navies.
This period was also marked more generally by rapid technological advances in ship propulsion, armaments and armour. Chilean requests for a new warship happened to coincide with the development of what became known as the ‘protected cruiser’. The Elswick-based Armstrong Company was at the forefront of this new design, which dispensed with cumbersome and increasingly ineffective belt armour for a lighter deck-armour close to the waterline which protected the vital organs of the ship. This considerable saving in weight enabled a heavier armament to be carried on a faster ship.
As such, protected cruisers quickly became the naval standard. When the Chilean archetype Esmeralda was completed in 1889, she briefly became the fastest warship in the world, and the first to completely dispense with sails. On a displacement of less than 3,000 tons, she carried a threatening armament of two 10-inch and six 6-inch guns.[iii] ‘Elswick’ cruisers were sought by navies across the globe, and with Britain enjoying friendly diplomatic relations and extensive business ties with both countries, Armstrong was in a strong position to supply the needs and wants of both navies. Over the next decade, the company delivered five more cruisers ranging in size to Chile, and three to Argentina, in effect, playing one national ego off against the other.
[i] This ship replaced an earlier Colossus Class carrier, ARA Independencia (formerly HMS Warrior), which had been purchased with the proceeds from the scrapping of the navy’s two old dreadnoughts.
[ii] Some of the criticism voiced at the time against the ship’s sinking by a British submarine on 26th April 1982 was premised on the ship’s age and supposed technological obsolescence.
[iii] She was sold to Japan in 1894. The reasons for the purchase are clear; Japan was about to go to war with China, but the reasons for the sale are not.
Bow Creek to Anatahan 